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Abstract 
This paper takes on the apparent paradox of India’s combination of durable democracy, capable 
bureaucracy, but a deficient development trajectory. It begins by outlining the nature of the 
problem. Then it summarizes and compares some significant approaches to drawing connections 
from governance institutions to development outcomes. Next, it reviews some of the 
contributions to understanding India’s political economy in the last few decades. Finally, it 
attempts to draw some lessons from India’s experience for the application of different theories of 
governance and development. The central lesson is that the paradox recedes when attention is 
paid to the subnational level, where India’s states encompass considerable variation in initial 
societal and economic conditions and in development outcomes.   
 
Keywords: democracy, embedded autonomy, governance, limited access orders, India, inclusive 
institutions, political economy 
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1. Introduction 
India’s combination of durable democracy and low levels of development make it an important 
case study for the role of the state in development. Evans and Heller (2018), in surveying the 
Asian experience and its lessons, label India as a “paradox” (p. 10) for this literature, and the 
“most analytically challenging” (p. 1) of the Asian states. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), in 
their sweeping analysis of the interaction of political and economic institutions in shaping 
development, have relatively little to say about India, but Subramanian (2013), in reviewing their 
work, points out that India (as well as China) is a significant outlier in the cross-country 
relationship between a democracy index and GDP per capita: it is “too economically 
underdeveloped, given the quality of its political institutions.” Subramanian concludes that the 
specificities of the history of India (and China) make them unsuited for parsimonious theorizing. 
Can one do better? 
There is a literature that starts from the specificities of India. Sinha (2016) identifies Frankel 
(1979), Herring (1983), Bardhan (1998 [1984]), Rudolph and Rudolph (1987), and Kohli (1987, 
1990) as early contributors to conceptualizing a political economy of India. Evans and Heller 
(2018) also remind us of Myrdal’s (1968) analysis of India in the context of looking at Asia, and 
Evans (1995) pays considerable attention to India, although his analysis of South Korea is mostly 
what receives attention – again because its story seems clearer than India’s. 
This paper seeks to distill and unify some of the vast literature on the state and development with 
the express purpose of trying to evaluate how well parsimonious theorizing can explain India’s 
experience. Evans and Heller (2018) and many others begin with the “state” and unpack that 
concept (for example, separating out politicians and bureaucrats, or different layers of 
government). An alternative perspective makes groups (often left abstract, but commonly 
defined by class, caste or possibly regional boundaries) the building blocks of coalitions that 
define particular kinds of social order (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). To the extent that a 
dominant coalition has a monopoly over the “legitimate” use of violence, this is the “state,” as 
conceived by Weber (1991): “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of 
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the use of physical force within a given territory” (p.78). Nevertheless, the different starting 
points are indicative of different methodological approaches. In the title, we have chosen to use 
the more amorphous term, “governance,” chiefly to avoid any reifying connotations of the 
“state.” 
The next section examines some of the relevant literature on the interaction between political and 
economic institutions in driving development. The approaches considered are those of the 
“developmental state” (for example, Evans, 1995), “access orders” (North, Wallis and Weingast, 
2009), inclusive and extractive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) and “political 
settlements” (Khan, 2010).1 This is not meant to be a comprehensive survey, but rather, a quick 
overview of the similarities and differences of approach. This seems useful in a situation where 
the different strands of thought may not fully engage with each other.2 Section 3 summarizes 
some of the analyses of India’s political economy, including the works called out by Sinha 
(2016) and listed earlier, but also more recent efforts such as Joshi (2017), as well as 
comparative studies such Evans and Heller (2018), where India is given significant attention. In 
much of the writing of economists, the focus is on normative economic policy (for example, 
Panagariya, 2008), with limited explicit attention to underlying political factors, but even neglect 
of politics in the analysis is worth pointing out in some cases. Again, we will not attempt to be 
comprehensive in treating a large literature. Section 4 then tries to offer some evaluation of how 
to make progress in understanding the “paradox” of India, perhaps to the point of removing the 
paradox entirely. This section further draws on studies of India, but emphasizes the subnational 
level much more. Rao and Singh (2005) was a relatively early attempt at this approach, but much 
has happened in India since then, and a large literature on decentralization efforts in India has 
emerged. Section 5 offers a summary conclusion for this paper. 
  
                                                          
1 The references given in each case are synthetic works of these authors, and each builds on earlier work of their 
own and others. 
2 In particular, Evans and Heller (2018) reference none of the other approaches, and other authors mention 
alternatives mostly in passing. 
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2. Theories of Governance and Development 
The explicit concept of a “developmental state” is often traced to the analysis of Japan’s post-
World War II economic success (Johnson, 1982), with further refinements based on other East 
Asian experience (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). The modern generalization and 
conceptualization of this approach can be attributed to Evans (1995), with his treatment of South 
Korea, Brazil and India, and the introduction of the notion of “embedded autonomy.” This 
modifies the Weberian idea of a capable, autonomous bureaucracy as the key implementer of 
state development policies, to emphasize that this group must also be “embedded” in society in 
ways that enhance information flows and “negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and policies” 
(Evans, 1995, p. 12). The intellectual influence of Weber also reminds us that there has been a 
much older tradition of recognizing the role of the state in development, in European cases such 
as France (for example, Loriaux, 1999) and Germany (Boldrin et al., 2012), as well as the earlier 
history of Japan (Horie, 1937).  
The key role of autonomy in this narrative is familiar, that of avoiding political capture by the 
private industrial elites who were needed for implementing crucial aspects of economic 
development. Evans and Heller (2018), in their summary, emphasize the other preconditions for 
a developmental state, namely, a balance of power that included weak civil society, and landed 
elites that had been wiped out by war or revolution. The final piece of the story is the perception 
of national elites that development was necessary for national survival amid geopolitical threats. 
The balance of power and perceptions of survival threats were differentiators from other 
countries with bureaucracies that appeared to satisfy the condition of embedded autonomy, such 
as the Philippines (Kang, 2002; You, 2005). 
One might even veer toward the view that what constitutes effective “embedded autonomy” 
depends on other, contextual and historical elements, and, furthermore, that the concept itself 
needs broadening (Evans, 2010; Routley, 2012), to the point where it cannot be a fundamental 
building block in understanding the developmental state. Indeed, the developmental role of the 
state may be too complex to be amenable to parsimonious answers (Bardhan, 2016). 
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Nevertheless, attempts at such theorizing abound, and we turn to alternatives that have received 
considerable recent attention. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) frame their understanding of what drives development in terms 
of economic and political institutions. Their key distinction is between “extractive” and 
inclusive” political institutions. Political institutions are the “rules that govern incentives in 
politics” (p. 79).They determine who has power and how that power is used. Centralization is 
necessary to allow for basic functioning of “the state” – which is conceived of again in terms of 
the Weberian “monopoly of legitimate violence,” but also as a coalition of interests. If political 
institutions distribute power broadly in society then Acemoglu and Robinson view them as 
“pluralistic.” Political institutions that are “sufficiently centralized and pluralistic” are 
“inclusive.” Otherwise they are “extractive.” Of course, there is a connection between economic 
and political institutions: extractive political institutions will tend to concentrate economic 
power, so that economic institutions are also extractive. The two go hand-in-hand, and one 
cannot expect inclusive institutions in one category to work with extractive institutions in the 
other category.  
Acemoglu and Robinson would presumably frame “embedded autonomy” as part of the synergy 
of inclusive political and economic institutions. But in the case of countries like South Korea, 
political institutions were arguably not inclusive when economic development took off. Political 
power was concentrated, and perhaps so were economic institutions, in areas such as domestic 
competition policy. The discipline on rent extraction came from external competition and 
geopolitical threats and rewards. While Subramanian highlights China and India as outliers in a 
cross-section regression of GDP per capita on a democracy index, there may be other examples 
that do not fit well (Boldrin et al., 2012). So it may be that the framework of inclusive and 
extractive institutions, while identifying and labeling an interaction between politics and 
economics that is needed for development (the creation and distribution of economic rents3), 
                                                          
3 Economic rent is surplus value accruing to a resource beyond what can be obtained in the next best use. It may be 
the result of natural (talent, for example) or artificial (legal barriers, for example) restrictions in supply. The process 
by which economic rents are created and shared is one way to think in the abstract about economic and political 
institutions and how development proceeds. 
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may leave out important factors, or not be analytically sharp enough. While Acemoglu and 
Robinson bring more focus on the “primitives” of the distribution of power, they may not 
sufficiently address the specifics of institutions such as the bureaucracy, and may overemphasize 
the priority of inclusive political institutions over economic institutions – the reverse causality 
from economic development to political inclusiveness may not be acknowledged enough. 
North, Wallis and Weingast (NWW, 2009) take an approach that is similar in many respects to 
that of Acemoglu and Robinson. They frame their analysis in terms of “social orders.” A social 
order is a stable coalition of groups, each with its own leader. Leaders within the dominant 
coalition, in particular, have privileged access to resources, and their group members are their 
clients. Privileged access creates economic rents, which are distributed by leaders. A primary 
characteristic of any social order is the control of violence within a society: this explicit 
emphasis on control of violence is one differentiator from other theories of governance, but is 
consistent with the Weberian view of the state, and goes all the way back to Thomas Hobbes in 
the 17th century.  
NWW distinguish between limited access orders (LAOs) and open access orders (OAOs). In the 
former, access to resources and rents is limited and personalized. In an open access order, access 
to resources is competitive and more impersonal. This translates into three “doorstep” conditions 
for an OAO: consolidated political control of organizations with violence capacity, support for 
perpetual “elite” organizations,4 such as government entities and private corporations, and rule of 
law for elites. LAOs are further graded into fragile, basic and mature orders. The first of these 
has difficulty controlling violence, and violence capacity is dispersed – organizations outside the 
dominant coalition (which is unstable) are not viable. A basic LAO does better on both fronts: 
violence control and institution-building, and the mature LAO does better still, but 
personalization and exclusion still matter. The OAO represents a difference in kind from LAOs, 
compared to the differences in degree among different gradations of LAOs. 
                                                          
4 The elite here is the dominant coalition, but membership in the elite is not fixed by personal identities and 
ascriptive characteristics, but by characteristics that can be acquired. For example, a meritocratic bureaucracy would 
be an elite group.  
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The NWW focus is on coalition formation among groups in society, and the impacts of the 
distribution of power for the type of order that emerges and evolves. In that sense, it is related to 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s conceptualization, but it also seems to have more commonalities with 
ideas of “weak” and “strong” states, in the literature on the state and development, or the 
interpretation of that literature in terms of institutional economics concepts such as credible 
commitment (Bardhan, 2016). Arguably, NWW also have a sharper notion of political 
competition, especially in leadership contests, than the inclusive political institutions of 
Acemoglu and Robinson (Kotwal and Roy Chaudhuri, 2015). Both NWW and Acemoglu and 
Robinson have, in the background, models of market competition based on dispersed and assured 
property rights, something that is less firmly in the state and development writings of non-
economists. On the other hand, the NWW emphasis on control of violence (Gray, 2015) seems to 
limit their view of wasteful (Directly Unproductive Profit Seeking, or DUP – Bhagwati, 1982) 
rent-seeking, which could involve other socially costly behaviors besides violence. Gray also 
critiques the narrow perspective on human behavior associated with neoclassical economics, just 
when economics is incorporating behavioral and evolutionary considerations in models of social 
order and dynamics.5 She also highlights the underlying transaction cost perspective that has 
shaped the NWW approach and which is a hallmark of the new institutional economics.6 
A final related approach to be described here is the “political settlements” concept of Khan 
(1995, 2010). Khan sees this as related to, but more precisely defined than, the concept of a 
“social order.” Specifically, his definition is (Khan, 2010, p. 4), “A political settlement is a 
combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms 
of economic and political viability.” Noting the difficulty of defining power in any kind of 
general manner, Khan (2010, p. 6) narrows it down to a game theoretic context: “the capability 
of an individual or group to engage and survive in conflicts.” He calls this “holding power.”7 In 
                                                          
5 This is obviously something less present in the “developmental state” approaches of non-economists. Exploring 
these issue further is beyond the scope of this paper. 
6 Again, Bardhan (2016) is a good reference for how one might bridge the different modeling approaches and 
perspectives of economists and non-economists. 
7 In more formal game theoretic models, one could further distinguish between discount factors, threat payoffs, 
punishment technologies, and so on, in isolating different facets of “holding power.” Khan also discusses sources of 
power, such as determination, mobilization strategies, and capacity for absorbing costs of conflict.  
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somewhat of a parallel to LAOs and OAOs, Khan distinguishes between clientelist and capitalist 
political settlements. However, he argues that the dimensions of variation in clientelist political 
settlements do not correspond to the gradations of LAOs posited by NWW. Furthermore, he 
argues that his pre-conditions for transition are not the doorstep conditions of NWW, but instead 
(p. 58) a sufficient level of “development and dispersion of productive ‘capitalist’ 
organizations.” There is much additional richness in Khan’s formulation, and in some ways it 
can also be seen as a bridge between the “developmental state” literature and the “institutional 
economics” rooted in game theory of Acemoglu and Robinson and NWW.  
If Khan’s approach is a useful hybrid, it is also worth noting that there are many other 
contributions that that are relevant as building blocks for theories of governance and 
development, beyond the four encompassing approaches outlined here. These include Olson’s 
(1965) pioneering work on collective action, Ostrom (1990) at a more micro level, and numerous 
formal models of social conflict or state-society interactions, such as Skaperdas (1992), Besley 
and Persson (2009), and Acemoglu et al. (2011), that provide parts of an overall understanding of 
the interaction between political and economic institutions.  
 
3. India’s Political Economy 
In this section we provide a quick tour of some of the salient analyses of India’s political 
economy, trying to relate them to the general theories presented in Section 2. Evans and Heller 
(2018) highlight several important themes with respect to Indian experience in Myrdal’s (1968) 
sprawling work: the importance of human capital and India’s failure to invest in it sufficiently, 
the problem of social inequality and lack of rural infrastructure, inadequate social protections, 
and ultimately a democratic apparatus with more form than substance – a “soft” state. There are 
many areas where Myrdal’s analysis was less accurate, particularly with respect to other parts of 
Asia, but this distillation of his diagnosis of India’s challenges seems to have held up well 50 
years later. 
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Frankel (1979) offered a pessimistic view of Indian politics, as unable to accommodate the social 
change needed for significant economic development. Her earlier work on the Green Revolution 
had turned out to be prescient in predicting the negative consequences of increased inequality, as 
can be seen in contemporary Punjab (Singh, 2016). An updated version of her more general 
analysis, bringing it up to 2004, reprised her earlier themes, but ultimately can be seen as 
description in search of a theoretical framework. 
To varying degrees, Herring (1983), Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) and Kohli (1987) address the 
problem of agrarian transformation in India, and their political economy analyses indicate the 
constraints of changing an unequal distribution of key resources such as farm land through 
gradual means. These approaches treat the “state” as an actor that is more or less autonomous, 
though Rudolph and Rudolph describe “demand groups,” somewhat similar to the standard 
interest groups of economists’ analyses,8 and Kohli views the state as captured by private capital 
to the detriment of the interests of the poor and disadvantaged. Of course, Kohli and Rudolph 
and Rudolph go beyond agrarian issues to tackle broader questions of political economy, and the 
latter, in particular, offer a theoretical framework that Sinha (2016) describes (p. 267) as having 
“married class analysis to Weber.” However, as Sinha points out, they are missing a concrete 
framework of the workings of the “state,” which remains an abstract third entity like capital and 
labor. Ultimately, the India-driven specifics of the Rudolphs’ analysis may not have been 
transferable enough to other contexts to be durable. 
Bardhan (1998 [1984]) and Kohli (1990) have offered more general insights into India’s political 
economy. Sinha (2016) summarizes Bardhan as combining a class analysis to public choice 
theories of the state, and his idea, that a balancing of varied class interests to keep the dominant 
coalition in charge creates a situation of multiple vetoes and obstacles to change, has been a 
powerful one for understanding the workings of India’s political economy. Perhaps one can 
relate this characterization to the mature LAO of NWW, or the clientelist political settlement of 
Khan’s analysis. Kohli offered a pessimistic view of governance in India – indeed, a “crisis of 
governability,” which he traced to the organizational weaknesses of political parties (often 
                                                          
8 Sinha highlights that demand groups in the Rudolphs’ conception are more fluid and “agitational” than interest 
groups. 
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reduced to collections of loyalists with no internal organization to speak of) combined with weak 
leaders, along with class conflict and a proliferation of demand groups. In retrospect, governance 
in India has proved more resilient, surviving many minority governments, managing a slow but 
rational process of economic policy reform, and achieving some decentralization without 
jeopardizing national unity or stability.9 
Bardhan updated his original 1984 analysis in 1998, after India had embarked on a process of 
“economic reform,” which has been marked by loosening of government control of the domestic 
economy, particularly industry, and opening up to international trade. This has also been seen as 
a “retreat” of the state, but that perspective probably needs qualification. Bardhan in 1998 noted 
that subsidies for various interest groups remained mostly in place, and did not see a major shift 
in the political equilibrium he had described 15 years earlier. While he was cautious about the 
continued progress of market-oriented reforms, he noted changes in the dominant coalition (more 
diversity, greater fluidity) and in bureaucratic attitudes (some acceptance that the state had 
overextended itself, beyond its capacity).He also suggested a connection between the two: 
traditional elites pushed out of government because of broader reservations would favor policy 
changes that would give them more opportunities in the private sector.10  
The thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Bardhan’s book provided a further opportunity for 
examination of changes in India’s political economy. Bardhan (2015) emphasizes the difficulties 
of collective action in the face of social heterogeneity and inequality, especially for long-term 
public investment. The apparent lack of state capacity is then potentially traceable to the 
systemic problems of inequality, rather than a shortage of expertise. He also highlights the 
increasing mismatch between aspirations and opportunities, especially for young people in India, 
and perceptions of illegitimacy of capitalism when corruption and unproductive rent-seeking 
flourish at the expense of more inclusive economic growth. The cost of competing in elections 
has also increased, attenuating the force of political competition. Again referring back to the 
                                                          
9 Singh (2018) offers an institutional analysis of the role of India’s federal structures and institutions in holding India 
together. 
10 Another possibility is that emigration among elites provided a way out in the face of broader caste-based 
reservations in the public sector. Furthermore, this has also created a positive feedback loop for economic reform. 
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models of section 2, this is very far from a situation of doorstep conditions for a transition from 
LAO to OAO, but the framing of India’s political-economic equilibrium and changes in that 
equilibrium, can be easily accommodated in that approach. 
Evans’ (1995) model of embedded autonomy, inspired by East Asian experience, was applied to 
India as well. Evans characterized India (along with Brazil) as an “intermediate” state along an 
axis running from “strong” (or autonomous) to “weak” (or captured). He viewed India’s 
bureaucracy favorably from a Weberian lens (though recognizing its imperfections), and 
relatively autonomous, but lacking the right kind and level of embeddedness. It lacked the means 
to garner useful information from the private sector that could guide policy interventions, and 
those interventions lacked selectivity and focus. Ultimately, those problems were linked to 
India’s size and the heterogeneity of its society. In this respect, “embedded autonomy” sits 
uneasily as an explanator of the Indian experience, a judgement reinforced by an expansion of 
the meaning of the term in the context of understanding the case of Kerala (p. 237): “it was in a 
position to put the relatively well developed bureaucratic autonomy that characterized the Indian 
system as a whole together with its own brand of embeddedness to produce a … an idiosyncratic 
version of “embedded autonomy,” extremely well suited to accomplishing a transformative 
project aimed at increased levels of welfare.” We return to the “idiosyncratic” case of Kerala in 
Section 4, along with the more general re-evaluation by Evans and Heller (2018). 
As noted in the introduction, most of the debate among economists with respect to India’s 
development trajectory has been about technical issues of policy reform, along with the goals of 
policy – what constitutes development? Bhagwati and Panagariya (2013) offered an implicit 
response to critiques of a policy focus on GDP growth (Dreze and Sen, 2013) by distinguishing 
between “Track I” and “Track II” reforms. The former are “conventional” market-oriented, 
growth-enhancing policy changes, such as trade liberalization. The latter are more redistributive 
in nature, aiming to reduce poverty and enhance the capabilities of the poor. Perhaps what is 
missing, though, from both sides of this debate is the nature of the political economy equilibrium 
that prevents these two tracks from being designed and implemented effectively. 
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Kohli (2006a, 2006b) provides an emphatic political economy answer, characterizing Indian 
economic policy reforms as more “pro-business” than “pro-market.” He explicitly relates his 
analysis to the work on East Asia of Johnson, Amsden, Wade and Evans cited earlier.11 The 
implications of his position for other theories of governance and development are also taken up 
in the next section. For now, it is worth noting that Kohli identifies the impetus for change as 
coming from the national political leadership, rather than any change in the embedded autonomy 
of the bureaucracy, or other aspects of state-society relations. This, in turn, was driven by the 
accumulated experience of the decade of the 1970s, during which economic growth was slow, 
and political unrest increased. A mix of leadership motives, including intrinsic factors along with 
calculations of electoral success were at work in this narrative. 
Finally, one of the most recent volumes on Indian economic reform (Joshi, 2017) includes an 
explicit analysis of India’s political economy during this time. Joshi emphasizes increased 
political and economic fragmentation, greater salience of identity politics, and increased 
corruption. His view of state competence and accountability is quite negative, more so, at first 
sight, than the perspective on the bureaucracy offered by analysts such as Evans and Kohli. To 
some extent, this reflects viewing the state more broadly than just the elite bureaucracy, and 
when that is recognized, there is probably almost unanimity on the weakness of the state below 
the top rungs. Corruption and crony capitalism are also reflected in a decay in bureaucratic 
autonomy, and even in the institutional decay of political parties. This suggests a state moving 
backward along any normative ordering, in any of the conceptualizations of that ordering 
discussed in Section 2. This is another issue to be examined in the next section. 
 
4. Governance Theories for India 
India’s development trajectory seems to present a challenge for theories that link the structure of 
governance to development performance, so much so that Evans and Heller (2018) pose the issue 
                                                          
11 Kohli is also categorical in viewing the pro-business shift as anti-labor, in line with a view of the East Asian 
experience as involving significant labor repression. On the other hand, the “labor” here is only the small fraction of 
the workforce that are in the “formal sector.” 
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as a paradox. Their own resolution of the puzzle has several components. First, they 
acknowledge the point made at the end of the last section, one that has been made by many, and 
one which does not accord with an emphasis on the embedded autonomy of elite bureaucrats: 
India’s state capacity tapers off dramatically outside a narrow, centralized elite. Second, they 
highlight another common observation, that India failed to be sufficiently inclusive in its initial 
development strategy, whether it was effective broad-based investments in health and education, 
failure to reallocate productive assets such as land, or fostering access to financial capital for 
those entrepreneurs who could generate jobs for the masses. Third, they argue that India’s size 
and heterogeneity make it difficult to achieve the right kind of embedded autonomy – there are 
too many different kinds of interests to be balanced. This is, of course, reminiscent of Bardhan’s 
political economy analysis. Fourth, they draw attention to the problems of governance at the 
subnational level, particularly the local level, where effective democracy was absent for decades, 
and still lacks adequate funding, even after the creation of formal democratic structures through 
constitutional amendments. 
We might abstract from these four components, and describe the situation as one of vertical as 
well as horizontal dispersion in characteristics and initial conditions. Furthermore, the emphasis 
on maintaining national political unity or integrity can be seen as resulting in sacrificing the 
building up of capabilities outside existing centers of power. In this narrative, India’s elites made 
a tradeoff between development and stability, and, like any elite, erred on the side of choices that 
defended the status quo. One can also include non-instrumental factors, such as hubris and self-
esteem: the derision accorded to “uncultured” nouveau riche small-town entrepreneurs by the 
successors to the colonial elite suggests this (Mishra, 1995).  
Putting aside cultural factors, which can be surprisingly amenable to adjustment if economic 
incentives change, we would argue that concepts such as the “state” and “embedded autonomy” 
may not be the right starting point for a theory of governance that can have explanatory power 
for the Indian experience. The same applies, to some extent, to the “inclusive-extractive” 
dichotomy of Acemoglu and Robinson, which may be also be too hard to pin down in its 
specifics for a theory that works for India (aside from other sources of critique of their analytical 
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narrative). This leaves the approaches of NWW and Khan, which we examine further in the 
Indian context. 
Kotwal and Roy Chaudhuri (2015) address the presumed paradox of India having a well-
functioning democracy without commensurate developmental achievement by highlighting the 
absence of a (p. 52) “political meritocracy based on mass support.” Specifically, there is no 
“competitive process at the ground level able to throw up meritorious leaders.” This is an 
important observation, which Kotwal and Roy Chaudhuri trace to the access order framework of 
NWW, and which they see as distinguishing that framework from the less precise concepts of 
competition contained in Acemoglu and Robinson’s inclusive political institutions. This insight 
provides a theoretical underpinning for tracing out the consequences of the decline of party 
organizations, noted by many of the writers referenced in this paper. Indeed, there are two further 
aspects of this deficiency that we can make more explicit.  
First, the problem with dynastic and personalized party organizations is not present just at the 
national level, but almost uniformly holds at the state level as well. The exceptions at the 
national level noted by the authors are the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Communist Party 
of India (Marxist) (CPM). But the CPM was effectively present only in two states, Kerala and 
West Bengal, while the BJP, having provided an example of a state level leader rising through 
the ranks to become prime minister, is now moving to a more personalized model itself. 
Regional parties at the state level, and even state-level components of national parties, are run as 
dynastic, personalized entities. Second, the absence of local level politics as a training ground for 
up and coming politicians has vitiated a potential avenue for demonstrating competence in 
governance, rather than personal loyalty.12 
To summarize, the insight of Kotwal and Roy Chaudhuri is that the nature of Indian politics, 
which can perhaps be seen as an offshoot of the importance of ties such as kinship, caste or 
feudal loyalty, is a major barrier to India’s governance structures moving toward the doorstep 
                                                          
12 In other countries, being mayor of a large city would be a natural proving ground for politicians, but cities are 
barely beginning to establish independent governance institutions, even after constitutional decentralization, because 
of the continued absence of fiscal autonomy and the shadow of state and national-level administrative and political 
control. 
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conditions for an open access order. It is important to note another aspect of the authors’ 
analysis. Like Evans and Heller (2018) and other analysts of India’s governance, they note the 
diversity of outcomes at the local level, that have resulted from decentralization.13 This diversity 
can be seen as a function of heterogeneous initial conditions: for example, the political ideology 
of leftist parties in power in Kerala and West Bengal changed the distribution of local power 
prior to national decentralization legislation. In Kerala in particular, human capital in the form of 
health and education was more evenly distributed than anywhere else in India. 
Mangla (2015) provides another subnational example, but focusing at the level of state 
bureaucracies rather than elected local governments (which in fact lack their own bureaucracies 
for policy design and implementation). He compares two states, Himachal Pradesh (HP) and 
Uttarakhand, which are similar in terms of size, geography and societal composition. He makes 
the case that HP has done better in delivering public education to its population because of a 
more effective bureaucracy, but that this effectiveness has not been determined by formal, 
Weberian characteristics, but instead by informal norms and organizational culture. In particular, 
he views HP as illustrating the positive impacts of deliberative governance, which allowed for a 
certain level of collective wisdom to emerge. The difference in Uttarakhand was a more 
legalistic approach, which might be considered more typical of Indian bureaucracy, and indeed, 
the state was only split off from the behemoth of Uttar Pradesh (with a population comparable to 
Brazil’s) relatively recently. Some of Mangla’s observations and analysis are reminiscent of the 
more well-known case of Kerala, which has been described by Evans (1995) as well as Evans 
and Heller (2018). The general lesson may be that it is not helpful to examine India in the 
aggregate, in trying to establish the line from governance institutions to development 
performance: there is too much local and regional variation. In addition, the evolution of local or 
regional norms may be an understandable and predictable phenomenon, as analyzed in Ostrom 
(1990). 
                                                          
13 References can be found in Kotwal and Roy Chaudhuri (2015), as well as Singh (2007). Important contributors to 
this literature include Pranab Bardhan, Timothy Besley, Esther Duflo, Dilip Mookherjee, Rohini Pande, Vijayendra 
Rao, and many others. 
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Another illustration of this point is the work of Khan (2010), echoed in Roy (2013). Khan’s 
framing is in terms of clientelist political settlements, whereas Roy uses the concept of LAOs. 
The analysis compares the experience of Maharashtra and West Bengal as examples of evolving 
LAOs. The Maharashtra case was particularly interesting, because it described how control of 
growing and refining sugar by the political elite in that state allowed them to provide space for 
industrialists to invest and prosper, at least relatively to the rest of the country. West Bengal, on 
the other hand, saw a different type of LAO, based on control of agriculture and stifling of 
industry. Khan, in particular, describes the details of political coalitions, rent-seeking, and the 
influence and interplay of caste and class in two states that were perhaps not dissimilar when 
India became independent, but diverged dramatically over the decades following. The 
complexity of comparing even these two subnational cases is illustrated by the differing 
geographies: in particular, West Bengal was separated from much of its former rural heartland 
due to Partition.  
Sinha (2005) is also an important example of comparison across states. She chooses Gujarat, 
Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, and characterizes her framework as that of treating these cases as 
multilevel developmental states. It is difficult to distill the comparisons she makes as easily as 
the Maharashtra-West Bengal comparison in the last paragraph, but clearly the variations in 
social composition, and the distributions of political and economic power were important in 
driving the different development trajectories of the three states. Tamil Nadu’s proximity to the 
software hub of Bangalore, even though it is in a neighboring state, also mattered.  
A comparison that has not been systematically explored, but would also be useful, is that of the 
neighboring states of Punjab and Haryana, which were part of the same state until 1966, during 
the early part of the Green Revolution. Geography and social composition have mattered here as 
well, with Haryana having the good fortune to see the development of Gurgaon as an outsourcing 
hub, and to be spared the consequences of the violent religio-political conflict that has had 
continuing negative effects on Punjab’s development. The emergence of a non-agricultural 
capitalist class in Haryana changed the room for how rents were created and captured in ways 
reminiscent of Maharashtra, while Punjab stagnated and fell prey to systemic, encompassing 
corruption without any meaningful political competition as a check (Singh, 2016). 
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These are not the only analyses and comparisons that can be made. Other states have been split 
and taken different trajectories. Some states are relative development failures, especially in the 
Hindi heartland of Northern India, but each in its own way. In other cases, states within this 
group have shown seemingly discontinuous changes in development trajectories. Whether an 
access order or political settlements framework is the best for considering these varied cases, or 
the developmental state or inclusive-extractive institutions models can do the job, is a question 
that can be resolved only by attempted application. The point to be made to close this section is 
that India’s case is not paradoxical or contradictory – it is simply being tackled at the wrong 
level of aggregation for many, if not most, parts of the answer. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have taken on the apparent paradox of India’s failure to fit encompassing 
theories of the relationship between governance institutions and development outcomes. One part 
of the answer we provide is that beginning with the concept of the state, and its developmental or 
non-developmental characteristics may not be the ideal starting point. The theory of inclusive vs. 
extractive political and economic institutions may also not provide enough analytical sharpness 
for the case of India. Instead, theories (such as those based on different kinds of access orders or 
political settlements) that begin with societal groups and organizations (formal and informal) 
may be the appropriate primitives, allowing a better focus on the distribution of power that 
ultimately shapes outcomes. This ranking of theoretical approaches can still be debated. It must 
also be acknowledged that all four theoretical approaches discussed here do acknowledge the 
importance of underlying group formations and the inequalities inherent in them, but perhaps 
they do not bring these initial conditions into sharp enough focus, nor trace the links from 
inequality to institutional characteristics precisely enough.14 
                                                          
14 Bardhan (e.g., 1998 [1984], 2016), in his own analysis and in surveys of these issues, does bring out the 
importance of inequality in shaping institutions of collective action. Rajan (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2011) both 
provide examples of formal models in which the inequality of initial conditions shapes the nature of institutions and 
the efficiency or inefficiency of economic outcomes. These kinds of models point the way to further analysis of 
India’s case.  
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However, the deeper and more practical message of this paper is that the apparent contradictions 
or predictive failures of governance theories in the Indian context arise from a failure to consider 
India’s subnational constituent units comparatively and systematically. We have provided some 
illustrative examples of what can be possible in such comparisons, and building up from a fuller 
set of these cases may be the way to understand how theories of governance institutions perform 
in explain India’s development outcomes. A further complication, of course, is that India’s states 
are not sovereign entities, but are influenced by, and influence the workings of the national 
government. This federal aspect of governance in India needs to be incorporated as well (Rao 
and Singh, 2005; Singh, 2007).15 
We recognize that no theory will explain everything, nor should it. Yet it is useful to close by 
acknowledging that this paper has not considered all the historical and institutional factors that 
may be important in understanding the Indian experience, nor has it considered all the existing 
theories and their variations. Nevertheless, we hope it makes a contribution to the larger debates 
about an important topic, and stimulates further research along these lines.  
 
  
  
                                                          
15 For example, the models referenced in the previous footnote could be extended to allow for the interaction of 
different tiers of government, if they are to be useful in understanding the Indian development experience. 
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